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of the State of U tab
RUSSELL KANO and TOMMY SEO,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
ARCON CORPORATION and BARCON
BARCON CORPORATION, Utah corporations, and MAE L. BAGLEY, LEO
L. CAPSON, GLEN L. PECK and
MANFORD A. SHAW,

Case No.
8739

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents contend that appellants' Statement of Facts
is misleading, immaterial, incorrect and contrary to the evidence
in many particulars and therefore prefer to re-state the facts
in a manner consistent with the chronology of events, the
evidence, and the findings of the lower court (R. 114-119).
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In the year 1894 a young boy of 14 by the name of William
Ferguson lived with his parents on a farm in the area of 13th
East and 56th South Streets in Salt Lake County. This area
contained many ~prings which created a stream, known as
"Spring Runs," where he swam, herded cows and spent much
of his boyhood and subsequent lifetime (R. 255, 256). At the
trial of this case, ~orne 63 years later, Mr. Ferguson (now 78
years old) appeared and outlined the transition of the area
from practically a pioneer outpost to the present time.
For the purposes of general reference a map has been
prepared and inserted on page 5, showing the general area
which is the subject of this law suit.
At that time the stream had cut a deep gully through the
western portion of what will be referred to as the "Ferguson
Property," having been created by natural waters long before
man came to the Salt Lake Valley (R. 299). One of the biggest
sources of water which fed the stream was a large spring area
(see map-p. 5, "Bubbling Springs" area), which Mr. Ferguson
described as follows:
"That is where your big spring was . . . it was ten
feet across and sand was bubbling up in there. You
could see the gravel, and there was fish in there over
a foot long" (R. 262).
From the "bubbling springs" area to the point where the
stream left the west end of the Ferguson property, the stream
into which it flowed dropped approximately six to eight feet
in elevation (R. 220, 299). After leaving the Ferguson property
the stream entered the east end of the property of Mr: J. W.
"Tim" Boyce, predecessor in interest of respondents.
4
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SPRING RUNS
As shown on Exh. 1-P
(Aerial Photo)
To Moyle Pond

"Bubbling Springs''
UPPER POND

(North)

Appellants' Drain

"Tim" Boyce Ditch
(Built in 1894)

LOWER POND
(1905)
FERGUSON PROPERTY
(APPELLANTS)
~-- fl

--Replacement Ditch
(1910·1920)
Used Until 1955
"TIM" BOYCE PROPERTY
(RESPONDENTS)
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Realizing the value of this excellent stream of water, the
elder Ferguson decided to use it for fish culture and irrigation
purposes. "Tim" Boyce, the neighbor on the west, also decided
to utilize part of the water for irrigation purposes, and so
the two neighbors, being assisted by young William Ferguson,
jointly furnished the materials and labor and constructed a dam
across the channel at a point where it was only necessary to
back the water to a depth of approximately three or four feet
(R. 153, 258-260), thereby making it possible to take water
out of the stream on both sides.
From this pond (referred to as the "Middle Pond") the
elder Ferguson and "Tim" Boyce took a spirit level and marked
the course of a ditch to run west to the Boyce property (R.
259). Without the assistance of animals or machinery, and
by using simple tools, the three of them picked and dug a ditch
from the "Middle Pond" to the east boundary of the Boyce
property. These neighbors traded work a good deal of the
time (R. 267, 275) and the Fergusons used the jointly constructed ditch to water an orchard which was located just west
of where the "Lower Pond" was subsequently built.
William Ferguson stated that he kept in close contact with
the area over the years and up to the present time (R. 273).
During his visits Mr. Ferguson observed that "Tim" Boyce
continued to use the water from Spring Runs every year, and
grew potatoes, hay, grain, sugar beets and corn on his farm

(R. 273).
Between 1903 and 1905 Mr. Ferguson built both the
Upper Pond and the Lower Pond, primarily for the purpose
of utilizing the water for fish culture (R. 264). Also, com6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mencing at about that time and at intervals thereafter until
approximately 1934, several flowing wells were drilled in the
vicinity to supplement the flow of spring water during the
winter months when the spring flow receded somewhat. However, these wells were subsequently capped prior to the commencement of this litigation and have no bearing on the issues
in this case as far as the parties to this appear are concerned
since they tapped water sources far beneath the water which
created the "bubbling springs."
At some time between 1910 and 1920, according to Mr.
Ferguson, the ditch which was built in 1894 from the "Middle
Pond" to the Boyce property was replaced with a new ditch
(R. 266) which served the Boyce property and the Ferguson
orchard from the "Lower Pond."
In 1914 a general water adjudication was made of the
waters of Big Cottonwood Creek in the case of rry he Progress
Company vs. Salt Lake City, et al., No. 8921" in the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County. This adjudication was
finally terminated in the Utah Supreme Court in 1918, 53
Utah 556, 173 P. 705. The Sixteenth paragraph of that Decree
adjudicated the waters here involved to J. W. "Tim" Boyce,
the Fergusons and others in the general area for fish culture
and irrigation purposes.
Respondents Seo and Kano purchased the "Tim" Boyce
farm from a man by the name of Brinton Bagley in 1944. This
farm consisted of approximately 25 acres, of which 20 acres
has been farmed and irrigated since 1894. Respondents have
raised celery, cabbage, onions, lettuce, corn and similar crops
which they have marketed in the Salt Lake area. Celery has
been their main crop.
7
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The Utah Legislature in 1949 passed Sections 100-2-14
and 100-5-15, Utah Code Anno., 1943, which in general provided that claimants to the use of water which had been established by diligence usage prior to 1903 could file a statement
in the office of the State Engineer setting forth the particulars
of their claim.
Although the legislative act provided that it was unnecessary to file such claims where there had been a court decree
adjudicating the rights as to any waters, Mr. John Ward, who
was in the office of the State Engineer at the time, prepared a
Statement of Diligence Claim (Exh. 4-P) for respondents, at
their request, giving as his reason that the Cottonwood Decree
did not sufficiently specify the particular rights of each of the
individuals designated in the Sixteenth paragraph. The Statement of Water Users Claim which respondents filed on October
13, 1949, was the very first statement filed in the office of the
State Engineer under the 1949 Act (Exh. 4-P).
Appellants Shaw and Capson came into the picture in
February, 1955, at which time they acquired the Ferguson
property from subsequent owners. During the month of February Shaw and Capson contacted the respondents concerning
the possibility of purchasing parts of the lands owned by them
adjacent to the Ferguson property on the west. However,
respondents informed Shaw and Capson that they were not
interested in selling any property, and further advised them
of their water rights and facilities (R. 168).
About a week later Shaw and Capson came to discuss the
water matter \vith plaintiffs. and asked 11r. Seo where he
wanted his ditch placed (R. 168):
8
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"I want you people to tell me where you want that
ditch placed, and I will have it there for you."
A general discussion took place and a rough sketch was
prepared of the substitute facilities which appellants agreed
to construct. It was even decided (R. 168) that a run-off or
waste channel could be constructed on the Kano-Seo property,
running north along their east line and dumping back into
the channel of the stream. It was also agreed that an open
ditch, conveying water by means of gravity, would run east
from their property to the source of the water.
About April 15, 1955, a group of individuals which included Shaw, Capson, John Ward and the respondents, met
on the Ferguson property, at which time the course of the
ditch was determined and Mr. Shaw stated:
"This is where the ditch will go. Through here, right
into your property."
Mr. Seo testified (R. 170) that he informed Mr. Shaw it
would be satisfactory to place the ditch as indicated. At no
time during the trial did Mr. Shaw deny making the statements
previously quoted.
On May 12, 1955, it became apparent to respondents that
appellants were not only filling in the ponds and destroying
their ditches, headgates and other irrigation works, but that
they had constructed an underground drainage system (see
Map-p. 5) for the purpose of intercepting all spring water
in the area (R. 427). Further, appellants took earth-moving
equipment and lowered the level of the land east of respondents' property, thereby making it impossible for water to enter
9
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respondents' property by means of a gravity flow (Exh. 5-P).
Respondents contacted an attorney the next day, who in turn
wrote a letter (Exh. 34-D) to appellant Shaw, notifying him
of the seriousness of the situation. Appellant Shaw ignored
their request that something be done (R. 421).
The drain which defendants constructed collected all of
the water which they had previously been able to secure by
gravity flow and discharged it into the natural channel of
Spring Runs Creek at the point where the original channel of
Spring Runs entered the property of respondents. This drain
was so constructed that it ran through the very middle of the
"bubbling springs" area (R. 16(}-Also see Map). This is
exactly contrary to the statements on page 6 of appellants'
brief. Further, although appellants' statement of facts states
that there was no visible surface stream when the ponds were
filled, the evidence showed that just before they were filled, the
"bubbling springs" area had been covered over with earthmoving equipment and the ponds were drained, thereby temporarily stopping the flow of surface waters (R. 393-also note
May 20, 1955 flow from area as shown on Exh. 7-P).
Being unable to secure water immediately because the
point at which it was being discharged was about 7 feet lower
than the point where their gravity ditch originally entered
their property, respondents suffered losses to their crops and
incurred other expenses. They were forced to construct a dam
in the channel of Spring Run Creek on their own property,
and to temporarily rent and later purchase a pump.
Although appellants claim in their statement of facts
( Br. 5) that respondents brought a separate suit against Salt
10
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Lake City due to capping of the wells, such is a clear misstatement. These respondents were merely made nominal defendants
by Salt Lake City in an action which it brought against the
State Engineer arising out of a denial of requests for change
applications. The issues in that case were not found against
these respondents; rather, the order granting the change application was expressly made subject to the water rights of these
respondents and fully protected them, thereby making an
appeal totally unnecessary. There is not now, and probably
never was, any real issue between Salt Lake City Corporation
and respondents.
The lower court awarded respondents damages for costs
of pumping, crop losses, and expenses incurred for purchase
of pumping equipment and the construction of a dam for
pumping purposes.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE
WITH THE WATER SOURCES AND NATURAL
CHANNEL OF SPRING RUNS.
II. APPELLANTS CANNOT DESTROY EASEMENTS
CREATED TO CONVEY WATERS ACROSS
THEIR LANDS TO THE LANDS OF ANOTHER.
III. APPELLANTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO
PUMP A QUANTITY OF WATER SUFFICIENT
TO IRRIGATE RESPONDENTS' LANDS.
IV. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT.
11
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V. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND AGAINST
FOUR OF THE APPELLANTS.

ARGUMENT
I

APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE
WITH THE WATER SOURCES AND NATURAL CHANNEL OF SPRING RUNS.
Appellants contend that a point of crucial public interest
is involved in this case. Respondents also contend that there
is a crucial public issue involved, but not the one advanced
by appellants. Whether a landowner has a vested right to
force a neighboring owner to maintain the water table in
an adjacent land at or near the surface level is not at issue
under the facts before the court.
Respondents submit that the real public issue before the
court concerns the right of a landowner to interfere with
ditches, headgates, dams, natural water courses, and large
and well-established springs located upon his lands to which
appropriators have acquired vested rights to take and use the
water and to maintain and use ditches and other easements in
order to convey such water to the latter's lands.
Respondents submit that appellants have used pages 9
to 23 of their brief in developing legal concepts which are
not at issue in this case. The cases there cited deal with
percolating water, maintenance of u·c1ter tables and sub-irrigation rights. However, we are not here concerned with percolating water, water tables or sub-irrigation problems; we
12
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are concerned with the locally famous "Spring Runs," an
active, dynamic water course which has been the subject of
appropriation and a general court adjudication during its
history.
It might be well to determine just what are "percolating"
waters since appellants use much space in developing the topic.
In the case of Riordan vs. Westwood, 203 P 2d 922 (Utah),
the Utah Supreme Court, speaking through Justices Wade and
McDonough, points out that the concept of "percolating"
waters in this state has changed over the years and that the
cases and texts were in confusion as to the term. That case
accepted "percolating" waters to be"diffused waters in lands privately owned, percolating or seeping through the ground, moving by gravity
in any or every direction along a line of least resistance, not forming any part of a stream or other body
of water either surface or subterranean, and, as far as
known, not contributing or tributary to a flow of any
defined stream or body of water ... " (Italics added.)
From the foregoing definition, and considering the factual
situation involved, one can hardly imagine any waters anywhere which more completely depart from the foregoing
definition. Compare the following established facts which
fully support the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R. 114-121):
( 1) "Spring Runs" were in evidence long before
the white man came to Salt Lake Valley, and have been
considered as "one of the old landmarks on the valley
floor" (R. 299).
( 2) These waters were so important as to be included within the Big Cottonwood Creek water adjudication of 1914.
13
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( 3) The waters which came to the surface in the
"bubbling spring" area were "perched" waters, part of
which originated far to the east in the Big Cottonwood
Creek channel, and traveled underground on top of
an impervious clay strata until they came to the surface
in the "Spring Run" area (R. 299, 305, 322).
( 4) Although the Moyle Pond located a short distance to the east had dried up and irrigation had ceased
in the area, just prior to the activities of appellants
complained of in this action, there was no noticeable
effect on the subsequent How of the springs which were
collected in the drain system of appellants (R. 321,
329, 463).
Respondents wish to take sharp issue with certain statements contained in appellants' brief at pages 22-23 wherein
they question whether any water would have been available
in 1955 because irrigation had ceased in the immediate area.
Actually, the How from the drains that summer consisted of
a flow of from four to six second feet (R. 15 7, 311), which
by local standards is a good, big irrigation stream. Further,
even as of May 20, 1955, a good, small stream was issuing
from the drain despite a total lack of irrigation anywhere
within miles at the time (Exh. 7-P). Commenting on the
summer flows since 1955, Engineer John Ward was "surprised
at the amount of water that actually came out of the drain"
(R. 321, 329). Viewing the situation generally, respondents
submit that appellants are now crossing their fingers lest the
drain should get clogged and much of their subdivision float
away.
Note: It will be well for the court to remember that
appellants were careful to place their drain through the very
heart of the "bubbling springs" area (See Map. Also R. 160).

14
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Appellants would have the court believe that we have a
situation somewhat akin to a sponge, where the "water table"
becomes saturated to the point where it gradually overflows.
Quite the contrary; it is hard to conceive of a more active spring
area than that involved in this case. Nor do the cases of
Peterson t'S. Cache County Drainage District, 77 Utah 256,
294 P 289 and Roberts vs. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 P 1014,
serve to help their cause. In fact, respondents contend that
both of those cases contain factual situations which pointedly
distinguish this case.
In the case of Roberts vs. Gribble the waters involved were
merely seepage and percolating water which the court found"Passed beneath the surface of and through the defendant's land . . . " and " . . . never reached said
Sanpitch Ri;,er by any known or defined channel or
course ...
In the case of Peterson vs. Cache County Drainage District
the waters involved there were actually percolating waters.
The issue of the case involved the right of the defendant to
dig a drain which lowered the water table of the land of the
defendant which had previously made it possible for the
plaintiff to irrigate his land by sub-irrigation. Notwithstanding
any encroachment upon that case which may have been created
by the decision of Riordan vs. Westwood, supra, it was pointed
out that the water in that case did not flow in any well-defined
channel and never reached the surface. The actual rule announced in that case was stated quite simply:
"Percolating water fesulting from the irrigation of
one's own land may be recovered and used by the owner

15
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before it leaves his land without invading any right
of an adjoining landowner."
A search of the cases has convinced this writer that there
is not a single Utah case nor any other case quoted by appellants which would justify appellants' trespass upon the water
and property rights of these respondents.
In the Utah case of McNaughton vs. Eaton, 242 P 2d 570,
there was a situation where various sources of water flowed
into McNaughton Gulch, which " . . . was a natural water
course before the advent of irrigation water in this neighborhood." The waters in the gulch arose from ( 1) natural sources,
( 2) canal surplus and waste waters turned into the gulch to
get rid of them, and ( 3) canal waters used to irrigate lands
on both sides of the gulch which drained into it above plaintiffs' lands; and ( 4) other miscellaneous sources of water.
The court observed that the three sources produced water
which was subject to appropriation, and that since the usage
began prior to 1903, no application to appropriate was necessary. In reversing the lower court and in affirming appellants'
attorney, who was on the other side of the fence in that case,
Justice Wade stated:
"Here we are not dealing with the collection of
diffused waters from the soil but with the right to use
waters which have already collected in a stream."
It is also interesting to note that plaintiffs' original Complaint (R. 2) and plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. 84)
both alleged:
"5. The lands of plaintiff and defendant ... overlie
an artesian basin."
16
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Since appellants' Answer (R. 96) admitted the foregoing
allegation they appear to be in a rather untenable position
at this point in view of the following quotation from Riordan
vs. Westwood:
"These cases held that the waters of artesian basins
are underground waters 'flowing ... in known or defined channels' . . . and (are) subject to appropriation."

If appellants are permitted to interfere with water facilities and easements and rights to use water which have been
protected and created by the long usage and diligence shown
in this case, and considering the source and size of flow of
the waters involved, respondents submit that there is hardly
a water right in the State of Utah that cannot be destroyed at
the will of the owner of the property upon which the water
anses.
As stated in 56 Am. Jur. Waters, p. 505, Sec. 14:
" ... the ordinary or natural course of water cannot
lawfully be changed for the benefit of one person or
class of persons to the injury of another. Accordingly,
one who changes the course of a stream must do so in
such manner as not to injure, or duly interfere with
the rights of, the adjoining proprietor, either above
or below, or on the opposite side of the stream."

II.

APPELLANTS CANNOT DESTROY EASEMENTS
CREATED TO CONVEY WATERS ACROSS TIIEIR LAND
TO THE LANDS OF ANOTHER.

17
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Appellants next contend that the court erred in holding
that respondents have an easement or right to require the
maintenance of the Lower Pond on the Ferguson property.
But the Judgment and Decree and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 114-125) contain no reference whatsoever to requiring appellants to maintain the pond. On the
contrary, the court made express findings that it was no longer
feasible for respondents to secure water through their original
facilities (R. 119, 123) and, in lieu thereof, ordered the
appellants to install and maintain an electrical pumping system
as a substitute means for securing water (R. 123).
These respondents have never insisted that appellants
maintain the Lower Pond. In their discussions with appellants
Shaw and Capson, respondents informed them that they would
be satisfied with an open surface ditch which would convey
water from the springs to their farm by a gravity flow. Respondents submit that they cannot see why appellants should
raise any issue involving the maintenance of the Lower Pond.
Appellants' brief (p. 24-31) contain cases inapplicable to
the factual situation in this case. Further, there is a noticeable
absence of Utah decisions. However, their quoted annotation
from 50 A.L.R. 841 clearly recognizes that there are circumstances which might require the continued maintenance of such
a pond if respondents had so insisted in this case.
It appears from the facts that the original ditch which
was constructed in 1894 from the Middle Pond to the "Tim"
Boyce property (R. 259) was placed in a new location running
out of the Lower Pond for the joint benefit of the owners of
both the dominant and servient properties to both shorten
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

its length and yet water both the Ferguson orchard and the
"Tim" Boyce farm (R. 271, 287). It can hardly be argued
by appellants that the original ditch which tapped the channel
at the dam in the Middle Pond was "abandoned" (Br. 4) as
they wish the court to assume. It is obvious that the ditch
easement was changed to a new location by mutual consent.
The situation presented is quite different from requiring the
maintenance of an artificial condition for the benefit of one
who had contributed nothing to its erection or maintenance
since the use by the "Tim" Boyce property of the Lower Pond
was tied to the work and labor contributed by "Tim" Boyce
in the construction of the Middle Pond.
The extent of respondents' rights would be covered in
this court's pronouncement in Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57,
276 P. 912:
" ... The defendants, however, allege, and the evidence shows, that a natural water channel ran across
the lands owned by the plaintiff on to the lands owned
by defendant . . . While the law is well-settled that
an easement by prescription cannot be acquired in less
than 20 years continuous usage, such is not the law
when applied to the right to convey water through a
natural channel across the lands of another."
"The law is also well settled that, when an easement
has once been established, its location may be changed
by an executed oral agreement betwen the owner of
the servient estate and the owner of the dominant estate
(Citing cases) . The consent of the owner of the servient
estate to a change in the location of an easement may
be implied from acquiescence . . . When the location
has been changed by an agreement, either express or
implied . . . such location cannot again be changed
again without the mutual consent of such owners."
19
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·· . . . When a person has a right to convey water
through a natural channel across lands of another, such
right is not lost when the owner of the right constructs,
without objection, an artificial ditch or ditches across
such land and uses .the same for a number of years
to convey the irrigation water theretofor conveyed
through the natural channel. In such case the owner
of the easement has the right to continue to use the
artificial ditch or ditches so constructed in lieu of the
original natural water course."
The foregoing rule was condensed in 56 Am. Jur., Waters,
p. 702, Sec. 244:
"In like manner if several persons contract expressly,
or so act that from their conduct a contract will be
implied, for the creation, maintenance, or use of an
artificial condition of a body of water, this contract
will be enforced so far as it can be consistently with
the rules of law."
From the foregoing it appears that respondents could
have insisted that the Lower Pond be maintained, not on any
dubious "riparian rights" doctrine but on the basis of an oral
change of location of the easement. However, since respondents
were agreeable to locating their ditches in any reasonable
manner which would deliver their water to them by gravity
flow (R. 170) the issue raised by appellants would now be
moot.

III.
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PUMP A
QUANTITY OF WATER SUFFICIENT TO IRRIGATE
RESPONDENTS' LANDS.
20
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Throughout their brief appellants acknowledge that they
claim no interest in the water (Br. 9) and make no contest
to the right to use it, yet whenever they try to establish a
legal point they invariably refer to water law cases which
actually involve contests to the use of water.
It is quite obvious that the ground area involved in this
litigation had so much water that appellants were trying to
dispose of it in every possible way. After they had constructed
their drainage system, the stream flow which was discharged
from the drain was as great as 4 to 6 second feet during
summer months (R. 15 7, 311) . Even during winter and early
spring months since the drain has been constructed, at no time
has the drain flow from spring sources been insufficient for
respondents' irrigation needs (R. 166, 252, 463-Exh. 7-P).

The really significant observation peculiar to this case is
that appellants have never contended that the amount of water
conveyed across the servient property by respondents has
constituted an unreasonable burden. Instead, they argue that
the court has decreed to respondents a water right of approximately 3.0 feet per second. Respondents deny that the court
decreed a "water right" in the sense implied. It only recognized
in general terms the existence of the water right.
At the trial appellants introduced testimony from a Mr.
Bagley to the effect that during approximately 16 years while
he owned respondents' property he had irrigated fewer acres
of land than respendents have irrigated. From this they argue
that thw:e has been a loss of part of the water rights by nonuse-a matter which appellants elsewhere admit does not
concern them. But they have missed the real issue entirely

21
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because we are here dealing with easement rights for ditches
and irrigation facilities which can only be lost or diminished
by a non-use for 20 years. Even if Mr. Bagley had irrigated
but one acre of land during his 16 years of ownership, any
prior established easement rights would not have been lost
unless an abandonment had been established. (See .Amended
Complaint-Count Two-R. 87, 88).
Since Mr. William Ferguson observed that "Tim" Boyce
irrigated respondents' property every year subsequent to 1894
to grow corn, potatoes, sugar beets, grain and alfalfa (R.
273), appellants have failed to produce any evidence which
would sustain their burden of proof that there either was no
easement or that its size and extent has been lessened by
non-use.
Our Utah Supreme Court has stated the rule quite clearly
in the case of Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P 2d
714, 170 A.L.R. 770-775, adopting the rule set ford1 in 17
Am. Jur., Easements, Sec. 72:
"The prevailing rule is that where a claimant has
shown an open, visible, continuous, and unmolested
use of land for the period of time sufficient to acquire
an easement by adverse user, the use ''-·ill be presumed
to be under a claim of right. The owner of the servient
estate, in order to avoid the acquisition of an easement
by prescription, has the burden of rebutting this presumption by showing that the use was permissive ... "

Ul·

. :L
li-

~

)_.

See also Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 394, Vol. I,
page 509.
"We think the better rule is that describe! as the
prevailing rule in the above ~.luotation. That is, where
a claimant has shown an open and continuous use of
22
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the land for the prescriptive period ( 20 years in Utah)
the use will be presumed to have been against the
owner, and the owner of the servient estate to prevent
the prescriptive easement from arising has the burden
of showing that the use was under him instead of
against him. This rule was mentioned in the recent
case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. vs. Moyle,
Utah, 159 P 2d 596 (on rehearing) 174 P 2d 148, 155,
where it was said: "It is true that to establish an easement the use must be notorious and continuous and on
this, adverseness-that is, holding against the owner
-will be presumed.''
In stating in the Judgment and Decree that "plaintiffs are
the owners and entitled to the use of approximately 3.0 cubic
feet per second of the waters of Spring Run Creek, . . . " (R.
123), the court was merely making a general observation
which was immaterial to the actual decision on the matter.
What is material to the decision is the requirement in the
Judgment and Decree providing for a pumping system for
respondents and ordering appellants to "maintain and operate
the said electrical pumping system for plaintiffs."
Appellants contend (Br. 36) that they can be forced to
pump water at the rate of three c.f.s. "almost at the whim of
respondents." Such is not the case despite the fact that for
three years they have refused to pump a drop of water.
Respondents insist only that appellants pump such amount
of water as is reasonably and necessarily needed for their crops
on 20 acres of land. As appellants indicate in their brief (Br.
34), the size of the flow need not exceed two second feet
at any given time (R. 155). Nor will respondents expect
appellants to pump more than the aggregate of 120 acre feet
23
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per year testified as necessary by Engineer John Ward (R. 332),
which is substantially identical with the amount (122.7 acre
feet) which they set forth at the time they filed their Statement
of Claim to Diligence Rights in 1949 (Exh. 4-P).
In fact, using the figures of their own witness, }.1r.
Templeton, of a five-month (May 15 to October 15) pumping
period (R. 156, 218) at a pumping cost of $15.00 per month
(R. 233), plus a minimum of $25.00 per year repair and
maintenance cost, or a total yearly cost of $100.00 for operation
of an electrical pumping system which can now be installed
due to the presence of electricity, respondents will agree to
pump their own water if appellants will give them a sum of
money which will, when invested at four ( 4%) per cent, yield
$100.00 per annum.
Should appellants decline any of the foregoing arrangements, it is submitted that the lower court retains ample jurisdiction to prevent appellants from suffering any undue hardship, since in any event respondents would be limited to the
amount of water which could be beneficially used.
It is submitted that the cases quoted by appellant on pages
36 and 37 of their brief relate only to situations involving
contests establishing decreed water rights where there is a
requirement of exactness as between contesting claimants.

Since respondents are not quarreling with appellants over the
size of the water right, but rather seek such reasonable quantity
of water as they have beneficialiy used, based upon established
casement rights to convey such quantity of water across appellants· lands, it \vould have been more appropriate for appellants,
both at the trial and on ~tppeal, to haYe attempted to produce
2·1
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evidence and law limiting the size of the water flowage easement on their servient property.

*

*

*

*

Appellants have further sought to limit the quantity of
water which must be pumped for respondents by claiming
that it is geometrically possible to irrigate all but five acres of
respondents' land by gravity flow from the catch-basin which
was built for pumping purposes.
This point was raised when, during the trial, appellants
took a survey crew and went upon respondents' lands to
establish an imaginary contour line which a ditch might follow.
Typically, this trespass was made without permission and
resulted in considerable tramping around in a freshly planted
onion patch (R. 452, 460).
Here, too, they have avoided the law and the facts:

( 1) As a matter of law, it is not necessary for one
having an easement for conveying water across the
lands of another to substitute, at his own expense, a
new method of conveying water in order to pacify a
wrongdoer.

( 2) The use of such a contemplated ditch would
create "odd-shaped" fields (R. 454), would make it
difficult to farm row-crops by making triangle pieces,
would create roadway problems, would create "waste"
ground, would cause uneven length of rows in each
field, and would cause difficulty in operating machinery
in narrow corners (R. 451).
( 3) Respondents would have to bear the expense
of constructing the ditch and the making of levees in
some spots (R. 45 5) .
25
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( 4) Any necessary enlargement of respondents'
present impounding dam would cause seepage and
would back water over the top of the outlet of appellants' drainage system (R. 45 5-45 7).

IV
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY THE
LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT.
At this point plaintiffs wish to quote pertinent provisions
contained in the Utah case of Hanson n. Salt Lake City, 205
P. 2d 255 at Page 261, which included language from the case
of Salt Lake City vs. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P 147, for the
purpose of illustrating the clear-cut right to damages in a case
of this type. Since the Gardner case involved the right to a
gravity flow of water, the statement quoted therefrom in the
Hanson decision appears appropriate:

" . . . If it be held, therefore, that a subsequent
appropriator of water need have no regard for the
diverting means or methods of the prior appropriator,
but may in fact or effect make prior appropriations of
water unavailable with impunity, then there is in fact
no such a right as a prior right, but all rights may, at
any time, be invaded o1· destroyed by a subsequent
appropriator by simply making the diverting means
used by the prior appropt"iato1' useless. To permit such
an invasion of a prior right would, in effect, amount to
an indirect taking of a prior appropriator's water. This
neither the legislative nor the judicial power can allow
without permitting confiscation of property rights."
" . . . the risk of interfering with prior rights and
the cost of any change in the prior appropriator's
means or methods of diversion should be assumed and
borne by the subsequent appropriator, ... "
26
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" ... As to surface waters, no one has ever seriously
made the claim that a subsequent appropriator could
deprive a prior appropriator of his water through the
means of diversion which he established and make him
pay an additional expense to get the water by a different
means of diversion."
Should a bare trespasser, making no claim to the use of
water, stand in a better position than a junior appropriator?
In answering appellant's claim that respondents did not
mitigate their damages, it would be well to realize that Mr.
Sea did not actually discover until May 12, 1955, that appellants' activities prevented a gravity flow of water from ever
coming to his lands (R. 427-Exh. 5-P). Prior to that date
he was relying on express representations of Mr. Shaw and
Mr. Capson that suitable gravity system would be installed
(R. 170):
"This is where the ditch will go. Through there, right
through your property."
The next day they contacted their lawyer, who then wrote
to Mr. Shaw (Exh. 34-D), but no answer was received in
reply to their demands that something be done.
Respondents immediately thereupon built an earthen dam
in the natural channel of Spring Runs in their own property
so as to create a pumping pond and immediately sought pumping equipment (R. 427). It was about ten days later (May 23,
1955) before they were able to get water on their lands.
In the meantime they sustained extensive damages due to
lack of water. An ample suppiy of spring water was then being
discharged from the drainage system which defendants built,
27
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having resumed its flow as soon as the drain was built on or
about May 5,1955 (R. 166, 215).
Although Shaw and the other appellants had indicated
to respondents as late as April 15, 1955, that a gravity flow
of water would be furnished by means of a ditch, the subdivision plat ( Exh. 30) which shows the contemplated drain
system having been inserted prior to March 29, 1955, makes
it evident that we have here an intentional tort showing that
appellants long previously had planned to do away with the
source of respondents' water. This circumstance should relieve respondents of any necessity for minimizing their
damages. See 15 Am. Jur., Damages, P. 441, Sec. 41:
"In some states the rule requiring one to minimize
the damages arising from an injury to property does
not apply in cases of intentional or positive torts ...
Thus, ... the rule does not apply in cases ... where
one riparian owner diminishes or detains the water of
a stream to the damage of another riparian owner."

If we allow to appellants the benefit of doubt and apply
the ordinary rule of minimization of damages, they still are
unable to complain. The evidence shows that respondents
were very busy at the time preparing their ground for planting
of celery plants and other crops, and that they were working
from sunup to sundown (R. 428). In addition to their farm
activities they also had to secure a pump and construct a
substantial dam so as to create a pumping pond.
Further, they incurred cash expenses which certainly
seriously impaired their financial position at the time--$100.00
for pump rental, $826.00 for pump and pipe, $100.00 for a
trailer to haul pipe and $80.00 to construct a dam. In addition,
28
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they incurred and paid pumping expenses of $1,634.25 in
1955 (Exh. 9-P) and $1,859.12 in 1956 (Exh. 10-P).
It is submitted that the proper rule to follow in respect
to minimization of damage is set forth in 15 Am. Jur., Damages, p. 420, Sec. 27 (citing Jankele vs. Texas Co., 88 Utah
325, 54 p 2d 425):
"One who is injured by the wrongful or negligent
acts of another, whether as the result of a tort or of
a breach of contract, is bound to exercise reasonable
care and diligence to avoid loss or to minimize or lessen
the resulting damage, and to the extent that his damages are the result of his active and unreasonable enhancement thereof or are due to his failure to exercise
such care and diligence, he cannot recover; or, as the
rule is sometimes stated, he is bound to protect himself
if he can do so with reasonable exertion or at trifling
expense, and can recover from the delinquent party
only such damages as he could not, with reasonable
effort, have avoided."
11

/n cases of intentional torts, the injured person is
not precluded, by his mere failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid the consequences of the injury, from
recovering for so much of the damage as results from
that failure." (Italics added).

Respondents' efforts certainly exceeded the test of a
"reasonable exertion" and the sums spent were more than
merely "trifling." From the same Am. Jur. citation, Section 28:
"The rule requiring one injured by the wrongful act
or omission of another to minimize the damages resulting does not require the injured person to make
extraordinary efforts or to do what is unreasonable or
impracticable in his efforts to minimize those damages;
reasonable diligence and ordinary care is all that is
29
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required of him. The measure of his duty is such care
and diligence as a man of ordinary prudence would
use under the circumstances, and the efforts required of
him must be determined by the rules of common sense,
good faith, and fair dealing."
Sec. 29:
"The efforts required of the injured party to prevent
or lessen his damages include a reasonable expenditure
of money, which he may recover as part of his damages. He is not, however, required to incur large expenses. A common statement of the rule is that he must
protect himself if he can do so at trifling expense. It
appears that a want of sufficient funds will excuse
an absence of effort to lessen damages.'' (Italics added.)
The measure of damages in cases of this kind has been
well stated in the case of Adamson vs. Brockbank (Utah 1948),
185 P 2d 264. The proper elements of damages were outlined
as follows:
"For general damages, the difference in the value
of the land with and without the ditch .
"
Testimony of Mr. Seo (R. 193, 197, 198):
Value of farm with gravity ditch ________________ $60,000.00
Value of farm without gravity ditch ____________ 45,000.00
Net Loss in Value ________________________________ $15,000.00
Appellants should feel fortunate that the court restricted
the measure of damages to a lesser amount which would allow
for actual pumping expenses incurred and for a substitute
method of putting water on respondents' lands.
Quoting further from Adamson

I'J.

Brockbank:

" . . . For specie~/ damageJ . . . . the crops already
planted or already in (!XiJtena for the year ... , "
30
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Appellants complain because the court awarded respondents $2,800.00 for loss of net receipts on a celery crop which
could not be planted because of lack of water. Let us look at
the facts:
( 1) Celery was the main crop of respondents' farm
(R. 147).
( 2) The ground had been specially prepared for
transplanting celery plants from the greenhouse (R.
171, 428).
( 3) Respondents maintained their own greenhouse
on their farm where they had 200,000 celery plants
growing (R. 426-Exh. 8-P).
( 4) Respondents had planted their celery plants
about March 10, 1955, (over 2 months previously) and
had spent a great deal of time in getting them to a
stage suitable for transplanting (R. 171).
( 5) The celery variety was special! y grown and could
not be replaced-"Utah Improved Jumbo."
In suggesting that respondents be allowed merely rental
value for the land involved they overlook the loss of customer
"goodwill' (R. 180) and the great amount of time and expense incurred in producing the celery plants, only to have them
turn yellow and rot before their very eyes because they could
not be planted. Appellants avoid any alternative suggestion
that they should reimburse respondents for their loss of the
greenhouse plants and other expenditures.
Appellants quote from 108 ALR 1174 as defining the
rule of damages in the foregoing situation. However, respondents maintain that the quoted statement is the minority rule
and that the majority rule would allow damages in this
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situation. At page 1181-2 of the annotation the great majority
of the cases state-" . . . if the plaintiff were confined to the actual or
market value of the growing crop at the date of its
destruction his damages would fall far short of compensation.''
From the annotation at 108 ALR 1181-4 the test of
whether recovery should be allowed depends on a consideration
of whether ( 1) the crop was in existence (note similar cases
in the annotation involving rice crops), ( 2) there was a reasonable certainty that the expected crop would have materialtzed, ( 3) the crop was an important element of the farm
program, ( 4) the acts of the defendant were something more
than simple negligence, and ( 5) the relief afforded is adequate
to compensate the injured party for his loss.

It is submitted that the destruction of respondents' celery
crop and the damages awarded easily meet the foregoing tests.
Respondents' proof of damages is found in Exhibits 8-P
11-P and R. 171-192.

With reference to certain other damage matters mentioned
by appellants in their brief which should be discussed, the
following answers are given:

(1) Must appellants buy tu:o pumps? (Brief 45).
No. They may take credit for the present pump or they
may have it.

(2) 1llr. Seo rradmitted he u·o;dd not sell his tractor
for" ... $500.00 (Brief 46).
The evidence established that respondents had to take a
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W-D Allis-Chalmers tractor originally worth $1,500.00 from
other farm use and put it to operating the pump. In computing an overall loss of value of $1,000.00 to the tractor,
Mr. Seo did not state that he wouldn't sell the worn-out
tractor for $500.00. He said, in explaining their serious lack
of working capital and financial means (R. 203):
A. Well, we can't afford to.

( 3) Ap pel/ants seek to attack the lower court's
memorandum opinion (Brief 46).
The court's memorandum is not part of the judgment role
and is not properly before this court.

Adamson vs. Brockbank (supra)
It is not part of the findings and may not be used to
impeach the findings.

Fowler vs. Security-First National Bank
303 P 2d 565 (California)

v
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND AGAINST FOUR
OF THE APPELLANTS.
As suggested by appellants in their brief, reference will
be made to the evidence implicating appellants Shaw, Capson,
Arcon Corporation and Barcon Corporation.
Both Shaw and Capson undertook to contact respondents,
and to make promises regarding the ditches and water system,
long before Arcon Corporation was formed on April 15,
1955 (R. 168, 170). Lloyd Jackson, the earth-moving con33
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tractor, made direct arrangements with the same two individuals in February, 1955 (R. 397) for doing much of the
work in the area.
Since Arcon Corporation was not in existence, it was only
logical that Shaw would answer on cross-examination (R. 408):
A. There was no corporation prior to April 15, 1955.

Q. So, until that time, you and Mr. Capson would be
dealing as individuals?
A. What dealings there were.

Q. And your activities, prior to that time, would be as
individuals, would they not?
A. Yes.

*

*

*

*

A. . .. the only purpose of the corporation would be
to operate and build and develop the area, . . .
It is admitted that Arcon Corporation may be liable to
respondents, which is obvious. As to Barcon Corporation, it
caused the Bowden drain to be installed (R. 362, 411) which,
according to Engineer John Ward, interfered with the flow of
water into Spring Runs (R. 303, 328, 330).
As for appellants Glen L. Peck and Mae L. Bagley,
respondents notified appellants' attorneys at the conclusion
of the trial that they would stipulate to a dismissal as to them.
However, had respondents voluntarily dismissed as to those
two defendants this portion of this brief would have probably
been in defense of a charge of releasing joint tort-feasors. The
inclusion of those two defendants in the Judgment and Decree
is as much the fault of their counsel, who represented them.
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The Judgment and Decree can be dismissed as to Peck and
Bagley insofar as respondents are concerned.

CONCLUSION
The writer sincerely believes that the trespass upon
property rights which has occurred in this action transcends
any legal or moral excuse which can be advanced in any
civilized society. If appellants' actions in this case can be
justified on the facts before the court, then Utah's unique and
necessary concept of appropriation of water rights will be
well on its way to destruction.
The Judgment and Decree should be affirmed in all respects
as to defendants Arcon Corporation, Barcon Corporation, Shaw
and Capson.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Respondents
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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